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Abstract: Environmental governance scholars argue that optimal environmental performance can
be achieved by matching the scale of governance to the scale of the resource being managed. In the
case of water, this means managing at the scale of the watershed. However, many watersheds lack
a single watershed-scale organization with authority over all water resources and instead rely on
cross-jurisdiction coordination or collaboration among diverse organizations. To understand what
“watershed governance” looks like fully, this paper maps organizations with rights to use, regulate, or
manage water in four subwatersheds in California (the American, Cosumnes, and Kings Rivers in the
Sacramento-San Joaquin watershed and the Shasta River in the Klamath watershed). We assemble
datasets of water organizations, water rights holders, and water management plans and use content
analysis and social network analysis to explore what water management looks like in the absence of a
single basin authority. We describe the institutional complexity that exists in each watershed, compare
the physical and institutional interconnections between actors in the watersheds, and then ask to
what extent these connections map onto watershed boundaries. We find that the ways in which water
management is complex takes very different forms across the four watersheds, despite their being
located in a similar political, social, and geographic context. Each watershed has drastically different
numbers of actors and uses a very different mix of water sources. We also see very different levels of
coordination between actors in each watershed. Given these differences, we then discuss how the
institutional reforms needed to create watershed-scale management are unique for each watershed.
By building a stronger comparative understanding of what watershed governance actually entails,
this work aims to build more thoughtful recommendations for building institutional fit.
Keywords: watershed governance; watershed management; complexity; groundwater; California
1. Introduction
Water is seen to be the quintessential wicked problem [1–4]. It is an essential resource for human
survival, so its management or control has been central to the development of civilizations over
human history [5]. Scientifically, the spatial and temporal distribution of water is highly variable and
nonstationary, leading to uncertainty about when and where it will be available [6,7]. This problem is
worsened for the harder-to-measure parts of the hydrological cycle like groundwater [8] and by the
increasing variability of temperature and precipitation under climate change [9,10]. Socially, water is
incredibly contentious, with numerous competing views on how water should be managed [11,12].
Besides the wickedness inherent in water itself, historical institutional arrangements have made
managing water inherently multilevel and complex [13]. In any watershed, there are numerous
actors operating at multiple levels [14,15], and these actors all have distinct and at times competing
goals [16]. Theories like the food-water-energy nexus [17,18] point out that water management
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decisions inextricably affect and are affected by the management of other resources, adding to the
perceived complexity of water governance.
The common suggestion to overcome and/or manage this complexity is to manage water at the
scale of the watershed [19,20]. Watershed governance extends from the idea that resources should be
managed at the scale that they exist, thereby improving institutional fit [21,22]. In practice, this means
either making new watershed-scale institutions and/or encouraging collaboration or coordination
between the multiple actors that manage water within the watershed [15,23,24]. Scholars have criticized
the watershed approach, noting that it may not always be the most appropriate scale [20] and can
complicate management because it adds a new layer to already complex governance systems [15].
However, the watershed management approach remains the consensual norm among policy makers
and water managers, with prominent examples like the European Union’s Water Framework Directive
mandating basin-scale management.
This paper assesses the physical and institutional characteristics of water management in four
watersheds in the United States (U.S.), the state of California, in order to understand what it would
take to achieve watershed-scale governance. We focus on California partly because it lacks any
explicit watershed-scale management. In 2002, the state initiated an Integrated Regional Water
Management Planning process, which aimed to create collaborative groups at the scale of the
hydrological region, but these local groups fragmented to create five times as many planning groups
ultimately [14,23], very few of which matched the watershed boundaries. We ask, in the absence of
a “basin authority”: What does water management look like in four relatively small watersheds?
We describe the institutional complexity that exists in each watershed, compare the physical and
institutional interconnections between actors in the watersheds, and then ask to what extent these
connections map onto watershed boundaries.
2. Literature Review
2.1. Complexity and Fragmentation in Water Resource Management
Few people would dispute that managing water is complex. In many contexts, and especially the
United States, layers of individual organizations have emerged that each manage different parts of the
hydrological system. For instance, separate organizations are responsible for allocating water quantity
versus regulating and protecting water quality; separate organizations responsible for water quantity
and water quality exist at the local, state, and federal levels. At the local level, many jurisdictions
have separate utilities providing drinking water, cleaning wastewater, and managing stormwater,
even in places where these separate functions share the same infrastructure. Numerous bordering
(and sometimes overlapping) jurisdictions or utilities may provide identical services in a relatively
small geographic area [23]. Finally, there are numerous other actors that influence parts of the water
system, including the land management agencies that oversee the terrain where this water collects, the
fish and wildlife organizations that protect the aquatic habitat, and the numerous non-governmental
organizations who play important roles in voicing how water should be managed and for whom.
Depending on how you view this institutional complexity, it can be a blessing or a curse.
Traditional views of government fragmentation note that having all of these competing players
increases transaction costs and reduces the efficiency of service provision [25]. Fragmentation also leads
to uneven application of policies or management interventions across a landscape [26]. As Wallis and
Ison wrote on water governance, “The sheer number and diversity of institutional arrangements can...
constrain effective NRM (natural resource management) governance, and can have major implications
for governance innovation including stakeholder engagement and concerted action among a group of
stakeholders” [15] (p. 4082). Conversely, approaches from the schools of complex adaptive systems and
polycentricity would argue that building redundancy into a system improves its performance [27–29].
By modularizing a system, risk is spread across numerous units [30], so in the instance that part of the
system fails, the resource as a whole (and the people that depend on it) are still intact.
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Whichever perspective a scholar adopts, managing this system is generally seen to be
challenging [1,13] relative to many other resources or service delivery problems. Managing in
the face of complexity requires not only gathering information and applying it to a problem, but also
prioritizing across competing measures, resolving conflicts, deciding under uncertainty, and being
flexible when things do not work as planned [31].
2.2. Watershed-Scale Management
Watershed-scale management is often touted as a solution to the complexity of water
governance [19,20]. A watershed is defined as the land area that drains to a specific location,
often a lake, river confluence, or estuary. The idea of the watershed as an organizing concept for water
management has a long history, from river basins acting as functional units in Third-Century China [32]
to John Wesley Powell’s proposal that the Western U.S. states should be created around rivers [33].
In more recent years, its popularity has spread, particularly with the advancement of “Integrated
Water Resource Management” in the 1990s [32]. Indeed, Davidson and de Loë called the watershed
the “de facto ideal boundary” among water managers and practitioners [20] (p. 367). The perceived
effectiveness of this idea was highlighted in a recent article on Powell’s proposal, which argued that
“Powell’s foresight [to create watershed-based states] might have prevented the 1930s dust bowl and
perhaps, today’s water scarcities” [34].
The arguments for watershed-scale management are fairly straightforward. Matching the
jurisdictional boundaries of a governance institution to the boundaries of the resource it manages helps
to ensure that the resource is managed as a consistent unit, achieving what is called “institutional
fit” [21]. The idea is that a forest, for instance, will be most effectively managed if a single institution
has jurisdiction over the entire forest, rather than having multiple institutions responsible for different
portions of the forest. In the case of water, scholars argue that the best unit to achieve institutional fit is
the watershed scale [35,36]. First, as a distinct hydrological unit, the boundary of the watershed can be
mapped more easily than other resources, and they (usually) do not change on timescales perceptible
to humans [20,37–40], making the watershed seem to be a relatively straightforward boundary. Second,
water sources and uses in a watershed are seen to be interrelated [41–45]. Third, given the problems of
institutional fragmentation across parts of a water system [23,41], aggregating up to the watershed is
seen to be an effective way of overcoming this fragmentation [44,45]. In other contexts, watershed-scale
governance is favorable because of the ability to govern resources locally [46–48]. Finally, besides these
more technical rationales, Cohen argued that the concept of a watershed is “both cohesive enough
to travel among different epistemic communities, and plastic enough to be interpreted and used
differently within them” [49] (p. 2207); in other words, that the watershed concept is popular simply
because it can signify whatever is useful for a particular context or group of people.
Despite its widespread use, there is still much debate about whether using watersheds as an
organizing concept is beneficial. First, the boundary itself may not be as straightforward to delineate
as is commonly assumed. A watershed is the area of land that drains to a particular point; while it
is commonly assumed that the point will be an obvious water body (e.g., a lake or an ocean), that is
not inevitable [41,50], and smaller units can easily be justified. In some environments, the physical
boundaries of a watershed may shift on fairly short timescales. While watershed management often
pays close attention to the interrelation of land and water management, there has been less attention on
groundwater management as part of the overall watershed [46]. In settings where groundwater feeds
or is fed by surface water, managing just the surface water could lead to unintended side-effects [50].
Second, creating basin-scale organizations does not erase existing political boundaries. This creates
several challenges. From an accountability perspective, it may be unclear who is ultimately responsible
for decisions made about the watershed or portions therein [50]. It also can increase complexity,
as layering new institutions can simply add to the fragmentation and create new coordination needs
and associated transaction costs and administrative burden [15]. The watershed concept also assumes
“that citizens recognize and engage at the watershed scale” [20], which is not necessarily true.
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Third, the problems faced by a watershed often do not match watershed boundaries. Problems
may arise from outside the watershed, as in the case of invasive species; likewise, problems emerging
from within the watershed may affect other locations [20]; or the watershed may not capture all
important areas of a related resource (e.g., ecosystems spread across multiple watersheds or portions
of multiple watersheds) [50].
Finally, it is important to remember that the scale at which water is managed is not inherent.
Choosing to manage at the local, watershed, national, or other scale is a political act with political
ramifications [41,49,51]. This choice matters substantively for democratic governance, as well as the
efficiency and equity of decision-making [51–54].
3. Materials and Methods
This research used a comparative case study approach to describe the physical and institutional
setting in watersheds that lack a central basin authority. We focused on subwatersheds, defined as a
smaller river that drains into a larger river. (In the parlance of the U.S. Geological Survey, these are
8-digit Hydrologic Unit Codes, nested within larger 6-digit codes [55]). Subwatersheds—rather than
entire watersheds from source to ocean—serve as a critical case [56], as they are relatively small (in size
and population) and should therefore be simpler than a full watershed.
3.1. Case Setting
California’s Central Valley, stretching from the Cascade Range in the north, the Sierra Nevada
to the east, the Tehachapi Mountains to the south, and the Coast Ranges and San Francisco Bay to
the west, covers over 200,000 acres and is known for agricultural production. Using less than 1% of
U.S. farmland, the Central Valley supplies 8% of U.S. agricultural output (by value) and produces
about 25% of the country’s food, including 40% of the country’s fruits, nuts, and other table foods.
Agricultural production in the Central Valley has an annual value of $17 billion. Additionally, about
20% of the Nation’s groundwater demand is supplied from pumping Central Valley aquifers, making
it the second most-pumped aquifer system in the U.S. [57].
Besides agriculture, the Central Valley plays numerous other key roles in supporting human and
environmental wellbeing. The mountains and foothills that serve as the source of the water are prime
recreational destinations for hiking, backpacking, skiing, and whitewater boating. The Sacramento
and San Joaquin Rivers were home to sizeable runs of salmon and steelhead (most of which are
now endangered), and the rivers and floodplains are critical for their restoration. Finally, the rivers
discharge into the San Francisco Bay-Delta, the largest estuary on the Pacific Coast.
For this study, we focused on four small watersheds within the Central Valley: the drainage basins
for the Shasta, American, Cosumnes, and Kings Rivers (Figure 1). Each is a subwatershed of a much
larger river: the Sacramento, San Joaquin, or Klamath. (Technically, as a tributary of the Klamath River,
the Shasta River is not in the Central Valley.) These watersheds were selected for variation in a variety
of hydrological and socioeconomic characteristics (Table 1). The American and Kings Rivers are both
quite large, in terms of watershed area, discharge, and population, while the Shasta and Cosumnes are
relatively small. The watersheds vary in the relative importance of surface versus groundwater as
water supply, as well as in their dependence on snowpack versus rainfall. The watersheds also span
from relatively poor (including predominantly white and predominantly nonwhite) to quite wealthy
regions. Finally, in all four watersheds, agriculture is a dominant industry, but tourism also plays an
important role.
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3.2. Data and Analysis
Th s study drew on a variety of Internet and document-based data sources. To compile a list
of actors from each watershed, we used the California Department of Water Resources (DWR)’s
water management planning tool [60] and lists of special districts from the California Public Utilities
Commission, water districts from the California DWR [61], and water agencies from the Association
of California Water Agencies [62]. In many instances, the organizations were listed by county,
not watershed, so we used maps and information on water sources/service area to infer whether an
organization was active and/or located in a particular watershed. Water rights data were obtained
from eWRIMS (the Electronic Water Rights Information Management System) [63].
We also obtained a variety of plans that influenced how water was or should be managed in
each watershed (Table 2). These management plans covered a variety of jurisdictions and scales, from
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municipal water supply to federal land management to regional water coordination. The sample was
as comprehensive as possible and included all state or federally mandated plans that had a link to
water within each watershed.
Table 2. Plans included in the analysis.
Plan Type Author Type Shasta American Cosumnes Kings
Agricultural Water Management Plan Irrigation District 2 7
County General Plan County 1 3 1 3
Federal Land Policy & Management Plan Bureau of LandManagement 1 1 2
Integrated Regional Water Management Plan IRWM Region 1 2 1 2
National Forest Management Plan US Forest Service 1 1 2
Natural and Cultural Resource Management Plan National Park Service 1
Urban Water Management Plan Municipal Water Utility 1 11 2 6
The plans were coded using QSR International’s NVivo 12 qualitative analysis software (Melbourne,
Australia). We assessed where different organizations obtained water, as well as how they discussed their
interconnection with other parts of the watershed and/or other actors in the watershed. Additionally,
the plans listed other organizations that they interacted with during plan preparation, including
coordination regarding water supply and demand, plan preparation, and of what regional networks
they were members. We culled this information to visualize water supply, coordination, and outreach
networks. Network analysis was conducted using the tidygraph package in R [64], with the figures
restructured to enhance clarity and meaning [65].
4. Results
4.1. Who Are the Actors?
We first assessed the distribution of organizations that managed water in each watershed
(Table 3). This included municipal and commercial water utilities (including counties and cities that
provided water directly), community service districts (utilities that provided service in unincorporated
areas), irrigation districts, tribes, electrical utilities who owned hydropower projects, groundwater
management agencies, as well as federal and state agencies with explicit activities occurring in the
watershed. For state and federal agencies, we included only those organizations with landholdings,
water rights, or active projects in the watershed. In other words, this table did not include federal,
statewide, or regional regulatory agencies, such as the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service or the State Water
Resources Control Board, unless they had unique powers or activities in the watershed. Additionally,
there was no centralized source of information on nongovernmental organization (NGO) activity, so we
opted to omit them from the table rather than knowingly undercounting their presence.
Table 3 shows that even the small watersheds (Shasta and Cosumnes) had a diverse mix of active
organizations, while the larger American and Kings basins had numerous organizations all making
decisions about water. The American watershed had a high proportion of municipal water agencies;
the Cosumnes had equal numbers of water agencies and community services districts (which served
rural areas); and the Kings had roughly an equal distribution between water agencies, cities that
provided water directly, and irrigation districts.
In these systems, we did not see any organizations whose jurisdictional extent matched the
boundaries of the watershed. Most of the organizations in Table 3 operated at fairly small scales, i.e.,
the service area for a city, irrigation district, or occasionally county. The Joint Powers Authorities
included several regional organizations, such as the Kings Basin Water Authority, but none of these
regional organizations mapped directly into the boundaries of the watershed, instead focusing on just
the upper or lower portions of the watershed.
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Table 3. Water management organizations by watershed.
Organization Type Shasta American Cosumnes Kings
Water Providers
City 5 9
Community Services District 1 4 6 5
County 1 2
Irrigation District 3 4 3 11
Public Utility District 3 1 1
Water Agency 20 7 12
Other Organizations that Manage Water
Electric Utility 2 1
Federal Agency 2 3 1 4
Groundwater Sustainability Agency 1 3 2 5
Joint Powers Authority 1 3 1 3
State Agency 1 2
Tribe 1 2 4 2
Other 5 2 4 6
Total 15 54 29 59
Note: A few organizations were water providers that also served as groundwater sustainability agencies. In these
instances (n = 5), we only list the water provider type.
Authority over water use was also exercised through legal water rights. Table 4 shows the number
of individuals or organizations holding different types of water rights (this was distinct from the total
number of water rights, as many organizations held multiple permits). Regarding the types of rights,
adjudicated rights were assigned by a judge; appropriative rights were a permitted right to use water
for any beneficial use; federal claims were federally-held water rights (including tribal rights and rights
associated with federal land); and a registration was a streamlined right for “a small domestic use,
a small irrigation use, (or) for a livestock stockpond subject to prior rights” (CA Water Code §1228.1).
A statement of diversion and use was any diversion not covered by another permit or registration,
for instance a claim from a riparian rights holder. Shasta, Cosumnes, and Kings each had fairly small
numbers of individual water rights holders, with a mix of appropriative, domestic, diversion, and
stockpond rights. In contrast, American had ten times as many individual water rights holders as the
other watersheds, representing all possible types of water rights.
Table 4. Count of water rights by watershed.
Water Right Type Shasta American Cosumnes Kings Total
Adjudicated 1 1
Appropriative 14 393 13 28 443
Federal Claims 3 2 5
Registration Domestic 1 26 1 28
Registration Livestock 2 2
Registration Stockpond 26 21 47
Statement of Diversion and Use 16 112 30 14 170
Total 32 562 43 66 703
Note: Cancelled, inactive, rejected, and revoked rights not shown.
The relative volume of appropriated water rights could give insight into who the important
players were in each watershed and how power was distributed among them. Figure 2 shows the
allocations of the 10 largest water rights holders by watershed. The x-axis indicates the total volume of
allocated water rights as a percent of the mean annual runoff (from Table 1). Shasta and Cosumnes both
had a mix of small and medium water rights holders, including irrigation districts, individual farms,
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water utilities, and environmental interests (the Nature Conservancy and the California Department of
Fish and Wildlife). In the American, the largest allocations went predominantly to large water utilities
(including the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (USBR)) and a few hydropower-generating electric utilities.
The Kings River was dominated by three organizations—the Kings River Water Association, Pacific
Gas & Electric (a hydropower utility), and the Kings River Conservation District—who each had water
rights five orders of magnitude larger than any other organization in the watershed.
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Figure 2. Volumes allocated, organization type, and year of permit for the 10 largest water rights
holders by watershed. The x-axis indicates the total volume of allocated water rights as a percent of the
mean annual runoff; the scale varies by watershed. Note that some organizations hold rights larger
than the average annual runoff.
As a prior appropriation state, users with the oldest water right had priority to divert water
before users with newer rights. In Shasta, the largest volumes were held by the organizations with the
oldest rights. In the American, the oldest rights were of medium volume; these would be filled before
the three largest water rights holders received their allocation. In Cosumnes, the largest user held a
relatively junior right, followed by more senior individuals. Lastly, in Kings, the two largest water
rights holders also held the most senior rights.
4.2. How Are Actors Physically Interconnected?
From a purely hydrological perspective, all actors within a watershed are interconnected. Water
originates as snow or rainfall in the mountains, then moves down toward the valley floor, where it
interacts (either gaining or losing) with underlying aquifers. Any decision to divert water from a
river, extract it from the ground, or return water to the river/aquifer thus affects all downstream or
down-gradient actors.
However, some actors are more directly reliant on one another through physical sharing of
water. Figure 3 summarizes the inter-organizational water sharing that occurred in each watershed.
It depicts all water supplies listed in each organization’s plan, including both direct withdrawals
from rivers or aquifers and supplies purchased from another organization. For context, the Central
Valley Project (CVP), run by the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (USBR), is an extensive system of dams
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and canals that draws water from multiple watersheds and supplies water to over 250 contractors
throughout California.
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Figure 3. The water supply network, including surface and groundwater sources, in the four case study
watersheds. Rivers are listed on the top, and aquifers are along the bottom. Shasta organizations are
indicated by blue, American by green, Cosumnes by orange, and Kings by yellow. Solid lines indicate
direct withdrawals, and dashed arrows indicate water purchases. Boxes with outlines indicate surface
water use; shaded boxes indicate groundwater use. “I.D.” = Irrigation District; “W.D.” = Water District;
“W.A.” = Water Agency.
In the Kings watershed (yellow), there was an intense reliance on groundwater, as every water
organization assessed used the Kings aquifer for at least a portion of its water supply. Out of the six
Urban Water Management Plans (UWMP) reviewed for Kings, five stated that they relied solely on
groundwater. The City of Fresno was the only exception, purchasing surface water from the Kings
River through a contract with Fresno Irrigation District and CVP water (sourced from outside the
Kings watershed) through a contract with USBR. The rest of its water came from a network of 260 wells
in the Kings Aquifer. Irrigation districts in the Kings watershed had more diverse water portfolios,
with conjunctive use of surface and groundwater resources being a common practice. Only one of
seven Agricultural Water Management Plans (AWMPs) used solely groundwater. Finally, only three
Kings organizations assessed purchase water from another organization.
In the American watershed (green), organizations tended to have more diverse water portfolios
than in the Kings, with most organizations relying on both surface and groundwater. Indeed, only one
organization (Rio Linda Elverta Lina Community Water District) relied solely on groundwater, and three
(of 14 total) relied solely on surface water. The remaining 10 American watershed organizations used
both, often drawing on multiple sources of each.
There was also far more inter-organization purchasing in the American watershed, with small
and large districts holding contracts with large water suppliers like the USBR (which operates Folsom
Dam as part of the CVP), San Juan Water District (SJWD), and Placer County Water Agency (PCWA).
Most (nine of 14) organizations in the American watershed purchased water from one or more of these
large suppliers. Purchased water occasionally formed an organization’s entire supply (e.g., Orange
Vale Water Company), but most organizations supplemented with groundwater and/or surface water
obtained directly from the river.
Of the large wholesalers in the American, SJWD relied entirely on the American River for its
supply, from both directly held water rights and contracts to purchase water from PCWA and USBR.
PCWA received most of its surface water from the American River, but also had contracts with USBR
to CVP water and with Pacific Gas & Electric to water from the neighboring Yuba and Bear Rivers.
PCWA also used groundwater in case of dry conditions if their surface water supplies were limited.
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Water supplies in the Cosumnes (orange) came from a mix of surface and groundwater, with
one organization purchasing water from another. For the one Shasta watershed organization (blue)
assessed, the entire water supply came directly from the Shasta River.
4.3. How Are Actors Institutionally Interconnected?
The previous section showed that many organizations were physically connected through shared
water sources. Here, we assess whether the institutions and interactions between these organizations
mirror this physical sharing.
4.3.1. Regional Networks
Within each watershed, there was a variety of water networks that coordinated on various
aspects of water management. The first were the Integrated Regional Water Management (IRWM)
groups, which were initiated by the state legislature in 2002. These groups aimed to improve water
supply security through the development of a shared regional plan for water management [23,24,66].
IRWM regions covered 87% of the state’s area and the entirety of the four watersheds assessed in this
study. However, the IRWMs’ geographic boundaries relative to each watershed boundaries varied
substantially. The Shasta River was part of the North Coast IRWM, which covered eight counties in
northwest CA; of a long list of affiliated organizations, only a handful came from Siskiyou County.
In the other three watersheds, the headwater portions were managed as part of a larger IRWM region:
the Cosumnes-American-Bear-Yuba (CABY) IRWM for the American and Cosumnes Rivers and the
Southern Sierra IRWM for the Kings (which covered the Kings and five neighboring watersheds).
The valley floors formed standalone IRWMs in the Kings and American watersheds.
The types of organizations involved in each IRWM also varied across watersheds. The North
Coast IRWM was large and diverse, with significant representation of water agencies, NGOs, and
tribes. The CABY IRWM had a substantial number of both water agencies and NGOs, while the
Southern Sierra IRWM had a variety of federal agencies and NGOs, but few water agencies. Finally,
the members of the Regional Water Authority (the lower American IRWM) and the Kings Basin Water
Authority (the lower Kings IRWM) were both made up of just water agencies, with other organizations
listed as “Interested Parties.”
Besides the IRWMs, the American and Kings watersheds were home to several other water
networks. In the American, the Sacramento Water Forum Agreement was a partnership that aimed to
create a more sustainable water supply while protecting riparian and aquatic habitat; almost every
water utility identified in the basin was a signatory to the Agreement, as well as several business
associations and environmental NGOs. As its name suggests, the Sacramento Groundwater Authority
sought to coordinate management of the aquifer underlying the American River (as dictated by the
Water Forum Agreement); members included the many water utilities that used this groundwater.
In the Kings, the Kings River Water Association was formed to solve water rights disputes and
coordinate management along the river; they acted as a water master, contracting water to member
agencies. (they were also the largest water rights holder in the watershed (Figure 2).).
4.3.2. Coordination and Outreach Networks
The second substantial form of coordination arose during the development of the many plans
about water management. For all the plans in this analysis, there were specific legal/regulatory ways in
which the organization developing a plan was meant to interact or coordinate with others. For instance,
for the creation of UWMPs, any urban water supplier that relied on a wholesaler for their water supply
must provide water use projections to their wholesaler (CA Water Code 10631(j)). Wholesalers also
had to provide information to their retailers, including the projected available water supply for sale,
which included projections on water availability in average, single, and multiple dry years. In terms of
coordination for the creation of UWMPs, CA Water Code 10,620 (d)(2) required urban water suppliers
to coordinate with other appropriate agencies in their areas, to the extent practicable; this usually
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translated to urban water agencies providing a table listing organizations who participated in the
UWMP development, commented on a draft, received a copy of the draft or final plan, or were sent a
notice of intent that the UWMP was being adopted. Other plan types similarly dictated who should be
consulted in gathering data, preparing the plan, and/or disseminating the plan.
Figure 4 maps the coordination networks as mentioned in each coded plan. A link between
the authoring organization and another organization was coded if that organization was consulted
regarding the planned water demand, provided comments on a draft plan, or otherwise participated in
drafting the document. Arrows flow from the organization that was the plan author to organizations
with which they coordinated. The figure also lists unconnected organizations: those that were
mentioned in the plan, but not as direct coordinators.
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Figure 4. Coordination network by watershed. Non-coordinating organizations (those that are
mentioned in a plan, but not as direct coordinators) are listed as a fraction of all organizations
mentioned for each watershed. “I.D.” = Irrigation District; “W.D.” = Water District; “W.A.” =
Water Agency.
This figure reveals distinct patterns by watershed. In the Shasta (blue), there were very few
organizations mentioned overall, and they were not indicated as coordinating. The American (green)
had much coordination between organizations. The key hubs were the City of Sacramento, PCWA,
and the Sacramento County Water Agency (SCWA). Additionally, there was a tightly interconnected
community of utilities that all received water from SJWD, and therefore, all coordinated on demand
and supply (as well as plan preparation). Additionally, American organizations (specifically SCWA
and the City of Folsom) connected to a handful of organizations in the Cosumnes watershed (orange).
The Cosumnes also showed a disconnected component anchored by Amador Water Agency. In
the Kings (yellow), the coordination network was driven by the City of Fresno and was entirely
unidirectional. Importantly, the networks showed the Kings as being “connected” to the American
via the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (grey). However, this meant simply that they both received water
from (and therefore coordinated with) the same organization, but they were unlikely to have actual
cross-watershed dialogue through USBR.
Besides coordination, the plans also mentioned the network of organizations that were sent the
plan or otherwise notified of its availability. We termed these “outreach”, as they likely did not have
any influence on the final version of the plan (unlike the coordination network). The number of
outreach organizations are listed at the bottom of Figure 4, as a fraction of all organizations mentioned
in that watershed’s plans. Far more organizations receive information about the plans (outreach) than
commented on or otherwise shaped their content. This was particularly true for the Shasta (where the
only mentioned interactions were outreach) and the Kings (where only half of listed organizations
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were in the coordination network). In contrast, almost all Cosumnes organizations interacted through
coordination, not just outreach.
4.3.3. Acknowledging the Interconnectivity of Water and Actors
In the absence of direct coordination with other actors, water organizations might also work toward
watershed-like management if they acknowledge the interconnectivity of water and actors within
their watersheds. By recognizing the shared effects of extracting water from the environment, or that
another organization’s actions might affect one’s water supply, demand, or quality, an organization
demonstrates awareness of the common-pool nature of water and is potentially more likely to engage
other organizations in co-managing the resource.
Acknowledgment that other people’s decisions affect an organization’s water availability and vice
versa was mostly observed in UWMPs, but unilaterally reflected a one-sided acknowledgment focusing
on how the author organization was impacted by others’ actions. In the UWMPs, interconnectivity was
most visible in the sharing of projected water use between wholesalers and retailers. This information
was vital to the creation of UWMPs in order to have an accurate projection of how much water supply
would be available for both the supplier and consumer. Acknowledgement of the impact of other actors
occurred far more frequently in the American watershed than the others, despite all organizations
fundamentally sharing water with other organizations. This was likely because the American had
much more exchange of water between organizations. However, the organizations in the Kings and
Cosumnes that primarily relied on groundwater gave little to no attention to the impacts or needs of
other pumpers in the basin.
In the UWMP sections discussing potential constraints to water supplies, there was also some
acknowledgment of other water users. In the American watershed, the plans usually reflected concerns
about the availability of water resources in dry years due to reductions in surface water supply pursuant
to agreements such as the Water Forum Agreement, USBR Operations Criteria and Plan, and/or CVP
Municipal and Industrial Water Shortage Policy. Because these were large scale agreements made
between multiple water users, the impacts of these constraints would be felt by anyone under one
of those agreements, a more indirect acknowledgement of other users on water availability. In the
Kings watershed, discussions of potential constraints were very brief and did not acknowledge other
water users; the only constraints that were discussed were needing to pump deeper and/or potential
future constraints under the Sustainable Groundwater Management Act. Potential constraints were
commonly dismissed with the justification that the Kings was an unadjudicated groundwater basin.
As for acknowledging different parts of the watershed in plans, we saw no evidence of actors
located in the upper basin/headwaters discussing water uses or actors downstream, nor actors located in
the foothills or valley discussing the upstream sources of their water. Discussions about the connection
between groundwater and surface water were fairly mute across plans and watersheds. Because of
the intense reliance on groundwater in the Kings watershed, there was no mention of any connection
between surface water and groundwater in the UWMPs, with the exception of the City of Fresno.
In the AWMPs, there was reference to conjunctive use of surface and groundwater, but often in relation
to using water rights and preserving groundwater for times of dry years. Similarly, in the American
and Cosumnes watersheds, the majority of plans that did mention a connection between surface and
groundwater focused more on preserving groundwater in case of the potential reduction of surface
water allocations during dry years.
Finally, as these subwatersheds were all nested within larger river basins, we might expect some
discussion of interconnections across watersheds. The IRWMPs often mentioned other IRWM regions.
For example, all IRWMPs had a section in which they discussed neighboring regions and gave general
comments about the potential benefits of IRWM in other regions. The American IRWM had a section
in which they discussed their relationship to the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta, but this was more due
to the fact that a small portion of the region was located within the Delta, while the section discussed
strategies to reduce dependence on Delta water supply. The Kings Basin IRWMP had a general goal of
Water 2020, 12, 766 13 of 19
collaborating with neighboring IRWMs on forest management. Outside of IRWMPs, the only mention
of interconnection outside the watershed was in Orange Vale Water Company’s UWMP. In the section
on potential constraints to water sources, they listed the largest threat to their supply as the “political
forces that include Southern California, agricultural, Delta, and environmental factions” [67] (p. 19).
This was also the only time across all plans that the complicated politics of water management were
acknowledged as a threat to water supply.
4.4. Summary
Table 5 summarizes the results for the four watersheds. This shows that the ways in which water
management was complex took very different forms across the four watersheds, despite their being
located in a similar political, social, and geographic context. There were drastically different numbers
of actors in each watershed. Comparing the large American and Kings, both had 50–60 separate
organizations managing water; however, the American had 10 times as many water rights holders as
in the Kings. The relatively small Shasta and Cosumnes had roughly equivalent numbers of water
rights holders as in the Kings; however, they each had far fewer water organizations operating in
the watershed (but still a sizeable number). Each watershed also used a very different mix of water
sources. For instance, despite the Kings River having a sizeable flow, cities in the region relied almost
entirely on groundwater. In the American, which had a similar hydrological availability of surface and
groundwater, most organizations used a mix of the two (but relying more heavily on surface water for
their regular use). We also saw very different levels of coordination between actors in each watershed,
with by far the most occurring in the American. Finally, none of the plans discussed their organization
as being situated within a larger watershed.
Table 5. Summarizing watershed characteristics.
Shasta American Cosumnes Kings
Number of actors Low High Moderate Moderate
Number of water
rights Few Numerous Few Moderate
Water supply
portfolios Surface
Predominantly surface
with some groundwater
Surface and
groundwater
Mostly
groundwater
Physical
interconnections
No interagency
purchasing
Diverse networks of
interagency purchasing
Minimal
interagency
purchasing
Almost no
interagency
purchasing
Level of
coordination Low High Moderate Low to moderate
Stated connection
with watershed Absent Absent Absent Absent
5. Discussion
5.1. Lack of Watershed Scale Management
In this paper, we assessed the current status of water governance in four watersheds in California.
We found that in the absence of a single watershed-level authority, governance in the watersheds
looked nothing like “watershed management”. We expected to find numerous actors in each watershed,
but even combined, their activities did not map to the watershed. Coordination between actors did not
orient around the boundaries of the watershed, as we saw minimal coordination between the upper
and lower parts of the basin. Actors in the headwaters talked to each other, as did actors in the valley,
but we never once saw evidence of coordination across this divide (or even written acknowledgement
that they were part of the same system). In order to achieve watershed-scale management, connections
between the headwaters and the lower watershed would need to be built.
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A second challenge in striving toward watershed-scale management relates to the difficulty of
defining the boundaries of the watershed [20,50]. Groundwater played an important role in all four
watersheds, both as a source or sink for surface water and as a water supply for organizations located
in the watershed. However, in no case did the groundwater aquifer coincide with the boundaries of
the upper and/or lower watershed. This was most prominent in the American and Cosumnes, as the
aquifer that was fed by the American River interacted with the Cosumnes River (at times giving water
and at times receiving water), despite the two rivers being in entirely different watersheds (Sacramento
vs. San Joaquin). In the Kings and American, there were also cities located outside the watershed that
used water—a common phenomenon in the western U.S. Given these characteristics, it was not clear
whether the desirable watershed boundary should simply be the surface water hydrologic boundary
or should account for groundwater and water exports.
This research thus adds to the literature that suggests that watershed-based management is hard
to achieve. Given the very different characteristics of the actors, water supplies, and constraints in each
watershed, shifting toward a watershed-scale perspective would require very different institutional
changes in each of the four watersheds. For instance, in the Shasta, there was a relatively small number
of players, but they could be further embedded in the Klamath Basin and North Coast IRWM, as they
currently appeared to play a minor role. Conversely, in the Kings, the connections needed to focus more
on recognizing the collective nature of groundwater and its interactions with surface water, as well as
on integrating non-water suppliers (like tribes and NGOs) into the conversation. In the American,
there were a number of strong networks in place; these could be extended to cover the entirety of the
watershed, but the sheer number of actors involved could make them unwieldy. That there was not
a single uniform change that would help all watersheds transform to watershed-scale management
suggested that it was not a simple institutional design to achieve.
5.2. Implications and Potential Sources of Variation in Complexity and Coordination
We also found varied levels of both physical and institutional complexity and coordination in the
four watersheds (Table 5). This was important because, besides helping managers scale up to manage
at the watershed level, coordination brought other benefits and challenges for effective governance.
Coordination increased transaction costs [68], requiring time and other resources from interacting
organizations. When done well, however, it could also help improve the efficiency and effectiveness of
governance. It could help the involved organizations achieve economies of scale, access knowledge
and resources, and solve the tradeoffs inherent in managing wicked problems [69–72], all potentially
helping govern more effectively.
While it was beyond the scope of this paper to assess the effectiveness of the institutional
structures observed in each watershed, the literature on coordination and complexity thus suggested
that we should see differential performance with respect to water management in the four watersheds.
The American watershed had the most actors, the most diverse water supply, and by far the most formal
and informal coordination. Thus, despite being more complex, American perhaps had developed the
interactions to help manage that complexity. Cosumnes also had decent coordination despite the smaller
number of organizations in the watershed. In contrast, the Kings watershed had a similar number
of actors, but far lower interorganizational coordination, perhaps reducing effectiveness (though
also reducing transaction costs). Lastly, there was minimal evidence of organizations in the Shasta
coordinating within the watershed; they only appeared to coordinate with far away organizations
through the IRWM process. This would likely increase transaction costs and may not provide many
benefits specifically within the watershed.
As for why we saw, the different levels of coordination across watersheds, comparing the
American and Kings basins, suggested that it may partially be driven by the different types of physical
interconnections. The two watersheds were fairly similar, both in the size of the river and in the
population served. However, in the American, the preponderance of interorganizational purchasing
made the fact that water was shared very visible; in the Kings, the actors were all drawing from the
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same aquifer, yet did not acknowledge this as an interdependency. It was perhaps this difference in the
visibility of codependence that led to more extensive coordination (both in plan preparation and in
the number of water management networks that existed) in the lower American watershed. Griggs
noted that regions dependent on surface water evolve very different cultures of water management
than those dependent on groundwater, as surface water requires shared infrastructure that therefore
requires cooperation [73]; this phenomenon appeared to be playing out here.
6. Conclusions
This paper evaluated the physical and institutional dimensions of water governance in four
California watersheds, with the aim of characterizing different types of complexity that arise in
watershed governance. As an exploratory study, this project had several limitations that raise
interesting opportunities for additional research. First, this research assessed institutions in form,
rather than institutions in practice. Coordination on paper did not necessarily imply that an organization
had substantive input into a plan. At the same time, we focused only on coordination as related to
plan development and dissemination, when there were undoubtedly many other ways that water
organizations worked with one another. Thus, we were both over- and under-counting interactions
between organizations. By observing coordination activities in practice, we could better understand
the types of coordination that were occurring and how they influenced governance effectiveness.
It is also important to note that California water management is evolving quickly with the 2014
passage of the Sustainable Groundwater Management Act (SGMA). Like IRWM, SGMA encourages
groups of users that share aquifers to develop plans for achieving sustainable groundwater extraction.
Like IRWM, many of the Groundwater Sustainability Agencies that have formed in response fragment
aquifers into multiple GSAs; the Kings aquifer has at least four GSAs overlaying it. Thus, there is a
new set of organizations and plans that are in the process of layering onto the management system
we have described, adding further to the complexity of watershed-based management. As for how
SGMA will affect the coordination networks described here, preliminary research suggests that cities
and large water agencies are the more dominant actors in SGMA collaborations [74], so it is unlikely
that many new actors will be introduced.
Lastly, our findings were also very much shaped by the Californian context. In considering
applications outside of California, it is important to note that the average California watershed was
likely much more complex and fragmented than what we might see elsewhere. At the same time, the
finding that coordination and complexity took different forms in relatively similar watersheds is likely
to hold elsewhere, especially in contexts with differing water sources and uses. That said, conducting
additional comparative work on the nature and outcomes of watershed-scale governance (with or
without a central basin authority) would greatly add value to understanding whether and under
what contexts watershed governance is an effective technique, an important task given its common
perception as the ideal for management.
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